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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JL;\_RDIXGE CO~lP~-\XY. IXCOR-
PORATED, 
Respondent, 
\S. 
THE EIMCO CORPOR_._~TION, 
Appellant. 
STATE)IENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8000 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor 
of Hardinge after a pre-trial conference at which the 
pertinent facts were all stipulated or covered by docu-
ments and statements filed with respective motions for 
summary judgment filed by each of the parties, requests 
for admissions and answers thereto, interrogatories and 
answers thereto. Appellant Eimco Corporation's princi-
pal defense is the statute of limitations, and the ques-
tion raised on this appeal is whether the obligation of 
Eimco to Hardinge, if any, is founded on an instrument 
in writing within the meaning of Section 78-12-23, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, or is ·subject to the four or three-
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year limitations provided by Section 78-12-25 and iS-
12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated. 
In March, 1945, Hardinge and Eimco entered into 
a contract in writing (R. 20-23), for the supply by Eimco 
to Hardinge of certain "U taloy" steel liner plates for 
shipment to the U. S. S. R. under lend lease proYisions. 
The original purchase order issued by Hardinge pro-
vided, 
"PRICE: $10.40 per cwt. f.o.b. York, Penna . ., 
(R. 20). , 
On April 19, 1945, Hardinge issued its alteration No. B 
to the purchase order (R. 25) which provided, among 
other things, 
"This alteration order also corrects the price 
to $9.40 per cwt. f.o.b. York, Pennsylvania, instead 
of $10.40 per cwt. as originally specified. 'l_1he 
$10.40 per cwt. as shown on the order was a typo-
graphical error. The price of $9.40 per cwt. i8 in 
accordance with our agreement with Mr. David 
E. Morganstern, Service Engineer." 
This reduction in price was accepted by Eimco ( R. -+ 7) 
but with some protest and subsequent claim that the 
reduction was obtained by false representations, all of 
which has colored the controversy which gave risr to 
this action (R_.. 76). On July 9, 1945, Hardinge issued 
its alteration No. E to the purchase order (R. 29) whieh 
provided, 
"Ship via frieght collect on Govt. Bill of 1~~­
ing, to : U. S·. Treasury D·ept., Procuretnen~ Dl.Vl-
sion, do Commanding Officer, Marietta lloldm~ 
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and Reconsigntnent Pt., l\lurietta, }>pnn~ylvania. 
Route via DRG-\\T- l\IO·P AC - PRR." 
The lTtaloy steel liner plates called for hy the eon-
tract \vere manufactured by Eilnco and shipped collect 
on a Governtnent bill of lading to the con1n1anding offi-
cer at the Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point, 
all as provided on alteration order E. Shipments were 
made on July 16, :21 and :25, 1945. Shipments constituted 
four hundred sL.xty-one thousand eight hundred ninety-
three ( 461,893) pounds for a total contract price of 
Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred Seventeen and 
94/100 Dollars ( $43,417.94), which was invoiced ·by 
Eimco to Hardinge on July 25, 1945, (R. 48) and paid 
by Hardinge on _A_ugust 6, 1945 (R. 18). S.ometime 
between that date and September 17, 1945, Hardinge dis-
covered that the United States Government had charged 
back to Hardinge the freight on the shipment (R. 49), 
and that no change had been made in the -eontract pro-
vision of $9.40 per cwt. to allow for the change in the 
f.o.b. points. On September 17, 1945, an invoice for 
freight was sent to Eimco by Hardinge (R. 50) and on 
October 17, 1945, a second request for payment of that 
invoice was made. There then ensued a series of corre-
spondence between Harding and Eimco with regard to 
the 1natter and finally this action was commenced on 
September 26, 19'49, by service of Summons (R. 4). 
The freight bill submitted by the government to 
Hardinge was actually paid by Hardinge on December 
26, 1945 ( R. 60, 61), and there is a dispute as to the 
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correct amount to be charged back to Eimco if this action 
is not barred by the statute of li1nitations and the Court 
should find that there is some obligation on the part of 
Eimco to pay freight. Eilnco contends that its obliga-
tion, if any, is only on the weight actually shipped and 
billed by it, to-wit: 461,893 pounds, at the rate at \Yhirh 
freight "\Vas charged back by the United States, while 
Hardings claims it is entitled to the freight rate of 
$1.43 per cwt. from Salt Lake to Pennsylvania, nlulti-
plied by the number of pounds at which the Govern1nent 
charged back the freight. The trial court allowed the 
a1nount actually charged back by the Governn1ent, but 
a different weight. 
Although the trial court made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law after the hearing at the pre-trial 
conference (R. 87 and 90), it is not clear on \vhat ba~i~ 
the court did determine Eimco's liability. It is appar-
ently on the theory that the written contract, pureha~P 
order No. 37898, (R. 20-29), as amended by the various 
alteration orders, required Eimco to pay the freight fron1 
Salt Lake to Pennsylvania, although judgment entered 
for I-Iardinge was based on the amount of freight actually 
charged back by the United States to Hardinge (R. 8~, 
R. 60). 
Eimco has also counterclaimed for an1ounts (lue it 
on other contracts subsequent to the one in issue, and 
the a1nount of the judg1nent a\varded 1-Iardinge is suh-
ject to the amounts due on those contraets. No issue i~ 
raised by either part~T on thi~ appeal a~ to the ruling~ of 
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the trial courts on the amounts due on the counterclaim. 
The controlling question before this court is whether 
the right of the purchaser to have an adjustment in the 
contract price of $9.40 per cwt. to compensate for a 
change in the contract as to payment of freight and the 
n1ethod and routing of shipment, when nothing is said 
in the contract on the subject, is founded . on a contract 
in writing or is a right in quasi-contract based on mistake 
or unjust enrichn1ent. It is appellant's contention here 
that it is the latter. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. HARDINGE'S RIGHTS, IF ANY, ARE NOT FOUNDED 
ON A CONTRACT IN WRITING. 
II. THE ONLY RELIEF TO WHICH HARDINGE MAY 
BE ENTITLED UNDER QUASI-CONTRACT PRINCIPLES IS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIO~~S. 
III. THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT FOR FREIGHT AL-
LOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR. 
ARGUMENT 
I. HARDINGE'S RIGHTS, IF ANY, ARE NOT FOUNDED 
ON A CONTRACT IN WRITING. 
The contract, as finally performed after seve-ral 
written modifications, p-rovided for a price of $9.40 cwt. 
shipped freight collect on government bill of lading to 
the Marietta Holding and Reconsignment Point via the 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, the Missouri 
Pacific Railroad, and the Pennsylvania Railroad. There 
is nothing said about Eimco paying or absorbing the 
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freight or about an adjustn1ent of the price to allow for 
the change in the arrangements as to the freight or the 
change in the method of shipment and the ultimate 
destination. In short, the written contract between 
Hardinge and Eimco at the date of shipment provided 
that the government would pay the freight to l\Iarietta, 
Pennsylvania, that Eimco was to ship the castings via 
the Denver and Rio Grande, the Missouri Pacific and 
the Pennsylvania Railroads to that point and that 
Hardinge was to pay Eimco $9.40 per cwt. This con-
tract was performed to the letter. What Hardinge is 
now seeking by this action is not damages for breach of 
that contract but equitable relief to change the contract 
to insert something the parties themselves neglected to 
state therein. 
F-or Hardinge to be entitled to any refund fron1 
Eimco founded on the written contract between the 
parties there must be something in the written contraet 
so providing. The change in the contract giving rise to 
the controversy between the parties, did 1nore than 
change the provision as to freight. It changed the ulti-
mate destination from York to Marietta. It speeified 
the routing of the shipment and switched the risk of 
loss in transit. Under the original contract, "f.o.b. York,H 
meant that Ein1co's price of . $10.40 included freight to 
that destination, but how much freight was absorbed in 
that composite price is· not apparent from the contrart. 
Under the original contract Eimco could route the ~hip­
lnent in any way and by such carriers a~ it eho~e in ordPr 
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to save \Yhatever shipping cost it could by such routing. 
linder the change it had to ship via the railroads speci-
fied. Confined to the four corners of a written document 
ho"T is a court to n1ake allo\vance for these· changes in 
adjusting the price for the parties vvhen they neglected 
to do so~ As stated by this court in 
Bracklein vs. R.ealty Insurance Company, 95 Utah 
490, 80 Pac. 2d -±71, at ±76: 
HA cause of action is not founded on a written 
instrument merely because it is indirectly con-
nected with the instrun1ent. And the fact that a 
written instrument 1nay be a link in the chain of 
evidence establishing the liability is not sufficient 
to say the cause of action is founded on such writ-
ing, nor is a parol acceptance of a written offer, 
alone, sufficient, to make an agreen1ent in writing 
within the statute." 
Suppose, for example, change order E had read Port-
land, Maine instead of Marietta, Pennsylvania~ Would 
not the parties have had to make some express agree-
ment with respect to adjusting the price to reflect the 
· increase in the freight due to the changed destination~ 
Or suppose Eimco had a rate of $1.2'5 per cwt. quoted 
by the Union Pacific-New York Central~ Would not 
Eimco have had to absorb the loss when the change order 
specified Denver and Rio Grande-Missouri Pacific-
l)ennsylvania Railroad unless some express adjustment 
were made in the written contract~ 
It may be admitted that the change in th~ written 
('Ontract to place the burden of freight payment on the 
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Government without a change in the price of $9.-!0 per 
cwt. in this particular case gave Ein1co a 'vindfall, but 
until the written contract price is changed can Hardinge 
say that Eimco received more than the written contract 
provided~ 
Under the original contract the Governn1ent played 
no part. By change order E a Government bill of lading 
was interposed. A Government bill of lading is a con-
tract between the carrier and the Government whereby 
the Government pays the freight. It is often employed 
by the Government to obtain for itself the benefits of 
land grant rates and/ or special rates under Section 2:2 of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, not available to ordinary 
commercial shippers. Whether the Governn1ent "Tould 
pass back to Hardinge the freight that the Governn1ent 
paid to the carrier would, of course, depend upon the 
terms of the contract between the Governn1ent and 
Hardinge. So far as the written contract between 
Hardinge and Eimco vvas concerned, after change ordPr 
E was issued the Government was to pay the freight. 
Adjusting the change. in the economic advantage of that 
assumption of a burden by the Governn1ent is something 
beyond the written contract between Hardinge and Ein1co 
as it stood in 1945 and as it stands now. Oiving I-Iardinge 
relief in this action cannot be founded on that 'vritten 
contract but rests in the realm of fireside equity and 
restitution .. 
It is submitted that the case at bar is striking]y like 
the situation in 
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BTo-tcn vs. Cleverly, 93 Utah 54, 70 Pac. 2d 881. 
In that ease the Plaintiff \Yas purchaser of real estate 
under a \Yritten contract. The seller claimed default and 
repossessed the property. Later the buyer brought an 
action to recoYer the pay1nents made on the contract and 
to assert on equitable lien on the property to secure 
said repayn1ents. Defendant seller raised the defense 
of the statute of limitations and the issue before this 
court \vas \vhether the right of the buyer to recover the 
1noney under the contract was founded on a contract in 
writing. S.peaking for a unanimous court, Justice I-Ianson 
said: 
HThe contract of purchase and sale involved 
in this action does not contain any express pro-
vision giving plaintiffs, as purchasers, a right to 
recover the purchase money paid by them in the 
event of the defendant's failure or refusal to per-
fornl, nor does it give, by express provision a 
vendee's lien for such payn1ents . . . . We must 
consider first \Yhether plaintiff's right to recover 
the purchase money paid by them is founded 
upon the written contract although it contains no 
express provision covering such right. If founded 
upon such con tract, then Section 104-2-22 R. S . 
. 1933, fixing the limitation at 6 years would be. 
applicable. We are of the opinion that plaintiffs' 
right to recover the pay1nents made by the1n rests, 
not upon the written contract, but upon an implied 
promise, created by law, of defendants to repay 
the purchase money paid if they should default 
in the performance of the contract. The action 
could not be based upon the written contract, for 
it contained no promise by defendants to return 
the purchase price. While it is true that the 
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In 
payments were rnade under the written contract 
and the relations of the parties were to that extent 
affected by the writing, yet that instrument is not 
declared on in the action to recover the payments 
made as a basis of the right to recover. It is onlY 
an incident to the accrual of the right to recove1:. 
The basis for recovery rests upon the implied 
promise of defendants to return the purchase 
money which the law creates fro1n their duty to 
return it upon failure by them to perform the 
contract and give plaintiffs what they contracted 
for. The action rests in implied assumpsit as for 
money had and received." 
Petty and Rid:dle, Inc. vs. L'lllnt, 104 Utah 130, 138 
Pac. 2d 648, 
there was no express agreement to pay the bills of the 
corporation. The written contract n1erely provided, 
"The balance to be divided equally after all 
bills payable are paid from the monies on hand.H 
This court rejected a contention that the action to recovPr 
defendants' share of certain bills later discovered wa~ 
founded on a contract in writing, stating, 
"Nor would the action be one upon a contract, 
obligation or liability founded upon an instrument 
in writing under the provisions of Section 10-t-
2-22 R.S.U. 1933, but would be governed by the 
provisions of Section 104-·2-23 as 'not foundPd 
upon an instrument in writing.' The obligation, 
if any, to refund the money in this ea~e did not 
arise from the written contract, but was in1posed 
by law because of the circumstances under "rhich 
it was· paid. The Restaten1ent of the Law of 
10 
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Restitution covers this field of liability under the 
heading ~ ~Iistake of Fact.' Section 20 thereof 
reads as follows: 
'_...-\_ person w'ho has paid another an excessive 
amount of 1noney because of an erroneous belief 
induced by a 1nistake of fact that the suin paid 
\vas necessary for the discharge of a duty, for the 
perforn1ance of a condition, or for the acceptance 
of an offer, is entitled to restitution of the ex-
cess.' " 
The court then cited and quoted with approval from 
Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra, 
and from cases from a number of other jurisdictions 
and concluded that the action was barred by the statute 
of limitations on the grounds that an action to recover 
money paid or obtained through an honest mistake of 
fact or law is an action founded upon an implied con-
tract or liability, not in writing. 
Compare the situation in the case at bar with those 
cases arising out of the holding by the Supreme Court 
of the United States that the pTocessing tax under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act was unconstitutional. See 
U. S. vs. Butler, 297 U. S. 1. 
vVhere the tax was included in the composite price and 
no provision was made in the written contract for the 
reduction of the price in case of change in the tax, no 
recovery was allowed on the contract. See 
United States vs. Standard Rice Co., 323 U. S. 
106, 89 Law Ed. 104; 
11 
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G. S. John.son Co. vs. N. Sauer Milling Co., 14-8 
Kan. 861, 84 Pac. 2d 934. 
But revision of the price was allowed under the contract 
when specific contractual provision was made. 
United States vs~ Kansas Flour Mills Corporatio·n. 
314 U. S. 212, 86 Law Ed. 159 . 
. Depending upon the equities of the situation, relief in 
some cases was allowed to buyers, not founded on the 
written contract of purchase and sale, but under quasi-
contract principles. 
Johtnson vs. N. Sauer Milling Co., Supra; 
Johnson vs. Igleheart Brothers, 95 Fed. ~d -! 
(C. A. 7). 
S·o in the case at bar there is no provision in the 
written contract for adjustment in the price to reflPrt 
the change in the method of shipment and the payn1ent 
of freight and routing of the materials to Marietta. 
Whatever relief Hardinge may be entitled to must ari~p· 
under principles of quasi-contract. 
Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra. 
II. THE ONLY RELIEF TO WHICH liARDINGE MAY 
BE ENTITLED UNDER QUASI-CONTRACT PRINCIPLES IS 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Assuming, arguendo, that Hardinge showed so1nP 
facts upon which it 1night be entitled to relief on princi-
ples of restitution or implied contract, it is subtnitted 
the applicable {Ttah statute of limitations had run hPforP 
12 
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the action \Ya~ instituted. 
Hardinge has t\vo theories available for seeking 
relief. One, on implied contract resulting from unjust 
enrichment, 
Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra, 
and the other for restitution of payment made by mis-
take, 
Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lwnt, Supra. 
Under the unjust enrich1nent theory the cause of action 
accrued 'vhen payment was made by Hardinge to Eimco 
on August 6, 1945. 
Leather Manrufacturer'.s Bwnk vs. Mercha~t's 
National Barnk, 128 U. S. 2·6, 32 Law Ed. 1888. 
In that case, speaking for the court, Justice Gray said, 
"In the case at bar the plaintiffs right of 
action did not depend upon any express promise 
by the defendant after discovery of the mistake, 
or upon any den1and by plaintiff upon defendant, 
but was to recover back the money, as paid with-
out consideration and had and received by defend-
ant to plaintiff's use. That right accrued at the 
date of payment and was barred by the statute of 
limitations." 
lTnder the mistake theory, which is the one apparently 
adopted by Hardinge, (see affidavits in the record, 
pages 49 to 70) the cause of action accrued, 
"on behalf of the corporation when it discovered 
that there was an overpayment and demand for 
13 
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restitution had been made." 
Petty and Riddle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra, 138 Pac. 
2d 648, 652. 
See also 
Weight vs. Bailey, 45 Utah 584, 147 Pac. 899. 
In the case at bar the alleged mistake was discovered 
by Mr. Eberhardt in the Accounting Department of 
Hardinge (R. 49), sometime between August 6, 1943 
and September 17, 1945, and subsequently on September 
17, 1945, a demand for payment of the freight (R. 50) 
was made. Summons was served on Eimco on Septenl-
ber 26, 1949 (R. 4) and the C.omplaint filed on October 
7, 1949 ( R. 2), both dates more than four years after 
the dates of discovery and demand. 
Accordingly, the claim is barred on either theory, as 
more than four years have elapsed between the accural 
of the cause of action in 194·5 and the commencement of 
this action in 1949. 
Petty arnd Rid.dle, Inc. vs. Lunt, Supra; 
Brown vs. Cleverly, Supra; 
104-12-25, Utah Code Annotated 1943; 
104-12-26 ( 3), Utah Code Annotated 1943 ~ 
Jeremy Fuel and Grain Compatuy vs. Denver & 
Rio Gra;nde Western Railroad Co., 60 Utah 
153, 207 Pac. 155. 
14 
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III. THE AMOUNT OF CREDIT FOR FREIGHT AL-
LOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS IN ERROR. 
Having held the action was founded on a contract 
in ·wTiting, the trial court proceeded to determine the 
amount to be charged Eimco for freight. Aside from 
the error in its ruling on the nature of the action and the 
statute of limitations applicable, it is submitted the trial 
court erred in fixing the amount of adjustment due 
Hardinge. The Government, in making its charge back 
to Hardinge, 1nade allowance for the difference between 
shipping from Salt Lake City to York and Salt Lake 
City to Marietta (R. 60). This the Trial Court also 
allowed (R. 88-89), charging Eimco exactly what the 
Government had charged Hardinge, that is, $6,233.12. 
It is submitted this amount is also erroneous as the 
$6,'233.12 charged by the Government is based on a 
weight of 466,900 pounds (R. 60). All Eimco shipped to 
Hardinge and all Eimco was paid by Hardinge was for 
461,893 pounds at $9.40 cwt. (R. 48, 64, 65). Applying 
the freight rate charged by the Government of 1.335 
cwt. to the weight shipped and billed by Eimco to 
Hardinge gives only $6,166.27, instead of $6,233.12. If 
the action is not barred by the statute of limitations the 
lesser amount is all Hardinge_ is entitled to recover. 
See proposed Findings of Fact, Paragraph 9 (R. 84). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing it is submitted the decision 
of the Trial Court on the claims of Hardinge should be 
15 
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reversed and judgment in favor of Eimco on its counter-
claim entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT 
& MABE·Y, 
PETER W. BILLINGS, 
Attorneys for Appella.nt. 
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